Thing v. LaChusa - 208 Cal. App. 3d 555, 231 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1986)

Rule:

Failure to see or hear an accident resulting in injury or death to a close relative does not bar a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the contemporaneous observation of the immediate consequences of a defendants' negligent act, which is the proximate cause of the injury and death. The "contemporaneous" requirement is satisfied where a mother is nearby and is at the scene immediately after the injury.

Facts:

Maria E. Thing was in the kitchen fixing dinner. Her son John A. Thing (Johnny) was playing outside with his little brothers. Maria was seated at the kitchen table drinking coffee. Some of the children came into the house. Johnny stayed outside. Maria sent her daughter Veronica to call Johnny indoors. Veronica returned to the kitchen and said, "They hit Johnny." Maria ran from the kitchen to the front yard. A crowd of people were in the street. She pushed her way through the group and saw Johnny lying in the street, blood coming from his left arm. Help arrived and Maria rode in the ambulance that took Johnny to the hospital for treatment of his serious injuries. Johnny's guardian sued the owners of the car and the driver, two public entities, a property owner and a utility company for damages for Johnny's injuries. Maria sued those defendants for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. James V. LaChusa, driver of the car, Cleason LaChusa and Roberta LaChusa, his parents, and LaChusa Dental Labs, his employer (collectively LaChusas) moved for summary judgment on Maria's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the motion "because [Maria] did not contemporaneously and sensorily perceive the subject accident and therefore cannot legally establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Maria appealed.

Issue:

Did the trial court err in dismissing Maria’s negligent infliction of emotional distress action?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The court reversed the trial court's judgment because there were triable issues of fact on whether Maria’s physical harm resulted from an emotional shock, which was proximately caused from her contemporaneous observation of the immediate consequences of defendant driver's negligence. The court rejected Maria’s contention that her proximity to the scene and her view of her son lying injured in the street, together with a neighbor's statement that her son was hit, was sufficient to bring Maria within the ambit of foreseeability. However, Maria’s rush from the kitchen and her view of the accident arguably permitted a reconstruction of the accident from her own observations. Thus, resolution of the issue depended on whether the declarations constituted Maria’s contemporaneous observation of the immediate consequences of defendant driver's negligent conduct.