Law School Case Brief
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. - 473 U.S. 568, 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985)
Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing. Its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.
Appellee manufacturers, who were 13 large firms of chemicals used to manufacture pesticides, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to challenge the provisions of 3(c)(1)(D) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 USCS 136a(c)(1)(D)), which allows parties seeking to register pesticides to rely on data submitted by previous registrants of similar products if they properly compensate those registrants, alleging that the statutory mechanism allowing the submission of disputes regarding the amount of compensation to binding arbitration, subject to judicial review only for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, violated Article III of the United States Constitution by allocating to arbitrators the functions of judicial officers. The District Court granted the producers' motion for summary judgment, holding that Article III barred FIFRA's absolute assignment of judicial power to arbitrators with only limited review by Article III judges, and enjoining the entire data use and compensation scheme (571 F Supp 117). Appellees took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Was the controversy ripe for adjudication?
The Supreme Court of the United States held that arbitration of the limited right created by FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not contravene Article III. The Court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court's supervening 1984 decision in Rucklshaus v. Monsanto, in which the Court ruled that FIFRA's data-consideration provisions may be deemed a "public use" even though the most direct beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme will be the later applicants.
The Court held that the present controversy was ripe, even though most appellees had not engaged in arbitration, because they were subject to the statutory arbitration provision. The arbitration provision did not violate U.S. Const. art. III, because appellee's rights under FIFRA were so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the federal judiciary.
Access the full text case
Not a Lexis Advance subscriber? Try it out for free.
Be Sure You're Prepared for Class