Trevino v. Thaler - 569 U.S. 413, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013)

Rule:

Where the state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. 

Facts:

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272, 278, 288 this Court held that “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the [State's] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez regarded a prisoner from Arizona, where state procedural law required the prisoner to raise the claim during his first state collateral review proceeding. Petitioner Trevino was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court and sentenced to death after the jury found insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a life sentence. Neither new counsel appointed for his direct appeal nor new counsel appointed for state collateral review raised the claim that Trevino's trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances. When that claim was finally raised in Trevino's federal habeas petition, the District Court stayed the proceedings so Trevino could raise it in state court. The state court found the claim procedurally defaulted because of Trevino's failure to raise it in his initial state postconviction proceedings, and the federal court then concluded that this failure was an independent and adequate state ground barring the federal courts from considering the claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Its decision predated Martinez, but that court has since concluded that Martinez does not apply in Texas because Martinez's good-cause exception applies only where state law says that a defendant must initially raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in initial state collateral review proceedings, while Texas law appears to permit a defendant to raise that claim on direct appeal.

Issue:

Does the Martinez  exception apply in Texas?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

Unlike Arizona, Texas does not expressly require the defendant to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an initial collateral review proceeding. Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim on direct appeal. This difference, however, does not make a difference in respect to the application of Martinez for two reasons.

First, Texas procedure makes it “virtually impossible for appellate counsel to adequately present an ineffective assistance [of trial counsel] claim” on direct review. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself has pointed out, “the inherent nature of most ineffective assistance” of trial counsel “claims” means that the trial court record will often fail to “contai[n] the information necessary to substantiate” the claim. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has also noted, a convicted defendant may make a motion in the trial court for a new trial in order to develop the record on appeal. And, in principle, the trial court could, in connection with that motion, allow the defendant some additional time to develop a further record. But that motion-for-new-trial “vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints and because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this point.” Thus, as the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded, in Texas “a writ of habeas corpus” issued in state collateral proceedings ordinarily “is essential to gathering the facts necessary to . . . evaluate [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel] claims.” This opinion considered whether, as a systematic matter, Texas affords meaningful review of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The present capital case illustrated why it does not. The trial court appointed new counsel for Trevino eight days after sentencing. Counsel thus had 22 days to decide whether, and on what grounds, to make a motion for a new trial. She then may have had an additional 45 days to provide support for the motion but without the help of a transcript (which did not become available until much later—seven months after the trial). It would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, within that time frame to investigate Trevino’s background, determine whether trial counsel had adequately done so, and then develop evidence about additional mitigating background circumstances.

Second, were Martinez not to apply, the Texas procedural system would create significant unfairness. That is because Texas courts in effect have directed defendants to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral, rather than on direct, review. As noted, they have explained why direct review proceedings are likely inadequate.They have held that failure to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the defendant from raising the claim in collateral proceedings. They have held that the defendant’s decision to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the defendant from also raising the claim in collateral proceedings. They have suggested that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the claim on direct review does not constitute “ineffective assistance of counsel.” And Texas’ highest criminal court has explicitly stated that “[a]s a general rule” the defendant “should not raise an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal,” but rather in collateral review proceedings. The criminal bar, not surprisingly, has taken this strong judicial advice seriously. Texas now can point to only a comparatively small number of cases in which a defendant has used the motion-for-a-new-trial mechanism to expand the record on appeal and then received a hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. And, of those, precisely one case involves trial counsel’s investigative failures of the kind at issue here. How could federal law deny defendants the benefit of Martinez solely because of the existence of a theoretically available procedural alternative, namely, direct appellate review, that Texas procedures render so difficult, and in the typical case all but impossible, to use successfully, and which Texas courts so strongly discourage defendants from using?

For the reasons just stated, the Texas procedural system—as a matter of its structure, design, and operation—does not offer most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. What the Arizona law prohibited by explicit terms, Texas law precludes as a matter of course. And, that being so, the Court did not find any significant difference between this case and Martinez. The very factors that led this Court to create a narrow exception to Coleman in Martinez similarly argue for the application of that exception here. Thus, for present purposes, a distinction between (1) a State that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2) a State that in theory grants permission but, as a matter of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction without a difference.