Ulm v. Mem'l Med. Ctr. - 2012 IL App (4th) 110421, 357 Ill. Dec. 953, 964 N.E.2d 632

Rule:

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish 1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and 2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof and the initial burden of production in a motion for summary judgment lie with the movant. Where the facts could lead a fair-minded person to draw more than one conclusion or inference, summary judgment must be denied. If the defendant raises an affirmative defense and establishes his factual position with supporting documents, the plaintiff must present a factual basis arguably entitling him to a judgment. However, the plaintiff is not required to prove his case at the summary-judgment stage.

Facts:

Plaintiff Janet Ulm worked for defendant Memorial Medical Center for about 23 years until she was discharged. At the time of her firing, plaintiff had been employed for some time as operations manager of defendant's health information management department. Plaintiff's department was responsible for maintaining patients' medical records and releasing them when subpoenaed or requested by an authorized party. For some time, the department's director was responsible for certifying these medical records for release but later on, plaintiff assumed this responsibility. Plaintiff was made responsible for ensuring the practices of her department’s compliance with the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals Organization. In 2005, defendant implemented a new electronic system for preparing and storing medical records. Plaintiff became concerned that the electronic system was noncompliant with legal and accreditation standards in several respects. She believed the noncompliance jeopardized the accuracy and confidentiality of defendant's medical records and exposed defendant to potential criminal penalties and loss of its accreditation. In a meeting with her supervisor, plaintiff refused to continue certifying the subpoenaed medical records, fearing she could no longer certify them in accordance with the law. According to plaintiff, after this meeting, defendant began retaliating against plaintiff. Retaliatory actions taken against plaintiff includes additional responsibilities that had been previously assigned to lower-level employees, relocating plaintiff to a less desirable office, subjecting her to ridicule among others. When plaintiff was asked to prepare her department for an upcoming inspection by the Organization. Plaintiff again expressed her concerns regarding the suspected noncompliance of defendant's record-keeping system with accreditation standards and state laws. However, in a meeting with other managers on the day that plaintiff was supposed to have a meeting with them, she was fired. Plaintiff then filed her five-count complaint against defendant alleging retaliatory discharge, violation of the Whistleblower Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent supervision and training. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. Plaintiff then appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate. 

Issue:

Did the trial court err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all counts of plaintiff’s complaint?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The appellate court, in response to the plaintiff’s various assignments of error, concluded that the plaintiff’s discharge, even if motivated by actions the employee took, could not have violated a clearly mandated public policy because the plaintiff, as operations manager of the health information department and its representative with respect to the hospital's accreditation, was herself responsible for bringing the defendant into compliance with the regulations she complained defendant violated. Also, the court held that the plaintiff’s refusal to sign hospital record certifications was not a protected activity supporting a claim under the Whistleblower Act, that the prolonged and unexpected deterioration of the parties' relationship, including a supervisor's comments to other employees about her performance, the court was of the opinion that while stressful and unpleasant to the her, it did not meet the standard of extreme and outrageous conduct required for a claim of IIED; and lastly, plaintiff’s claims for NIED and negligent supervision and training were preempted by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Thus, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.