United States v. Banks - 540 U.S. 31, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003)

Rule:

18 U.S.C.S. § 3109 implicates the exceptions to the common law knock-and-announce requirement that inform the Fourth Amendment itself. The upshot is that § 3109 is subject to an exigent circumstances exception which qualifies the requirement of refusal after notice, just as it qualifies the obligation to announce in the first place. Absent exigency, the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one. But in a case where officers knock and announce their presence, and forcibly enter after a reasonable suspicion of exigency had ripened, their entry satisfies § 3109 as well as the Fourth Amendment, even without refusal of admittance.

Facts:

At about 2 p.m. on a Wednesday, federal and local law-enforcement officers, who had a warrant to search for cocaine in defendant Lashawn Lowell Banks’ two-bedroom apartment, called out "police search warrant" and knocked on the apartment's front door. After waiting 15 to 20 seconds with no response, the officers broke open the door with a battering ram. The defendant, who was in the shower at the time, testified that he had heard nothing until the crash of the door. The search produced weapons, crack cocaine, and other evidence of dealing in illegal drugs. The defendant, who was charged with drug and firearms crimes, argued that the officers who had executed the search had, by waiting an unreasonably short time before forcing entry, violated the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment and 18 USCS § 3109, which authorized a federal law-enforcement officer to break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of the officer's authority and purpose, the officer was refused admittance. After a Federal District Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence produced by the search, the defendant pleased guilty but reserved his right to challenge the search on appeal. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, using a four-part scheme for vetting knock-and-announce entries, held that the officers' 15-to-20 second delay before knocking down the apartment door was insufficient to satisfy constitutional safeguards, and accordingly reversed defendant’s convictions. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the government appealed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals.

Issue:

By only waiting 15-20 seconds before breaking open the door of defendant’s apartment, did the police officers violate defendant’s constitutional rights?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The United States Supreme Court held that, while it was a close question, the period that the officers waited prior to the forced entry was sufficient to satisfy constitutional protections. The officers had no way of knowing defendant was unable to hear the officers' announcement, and the officers' reasonable suspicion of significant exigent circumstances in the imminent loss of evidence during any further delay was the controlling factor. Similarly, and regardless of whether defendant could reasonably be expected to open the door within the time the officers waited after announcing their presence, the officers reasonably determined that any further delay would allow defendant to dispose of evidence.