United States v. Carson - 870 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2017)

Rule:

Fed. R. Evid. 412, often referred to as the "rape shield law," states that the following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victimʹs sexual predisposition. Fed. R. Evid. 412(a). However, Rule 412(b) recognizes exceptions and provides, in part, that a court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case: evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(B) and (C).

Facts:

A jury convicted defendant McKenzie Carson of four counts of violating the federal sex trafficking statute. Three of those counts alleged that defendant was engaged in sex trafficking with knowledge that the victims were forced, threatened or coerced. The other count alleged that the defendant was involved in the sex trafficking of a person under eighteen. Defendant asked this court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial; he claimed that he was prevented from eliciting relevant testimony from his victims, that he was precluded from effectively cross-examining a key witness, and that the district court errantly admitted evidence of uncharged bad acts, and that incorrectly worded jury instructions prejudiced him.

Issue:

Should the defendant’s conviction of violating the federal sex trafficking statute be reversed?

Answer:

No. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence.

Conclusion:

The court held that the district court did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a confrontation during his trial on charges alleging that he violated the federal sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1591, when it rejected the defendant's attempt to show that women who worked for him as prostitutes worked as prostitutes before he met them. Moreover, the court did not err when it limited the defendant's cross-examination of a witness who testified under a grant of immunity. Although the court found that an instruction the court gave the jury on reckless disregard was incorrect, the error was harmless. Evidence that the defendant used violence and threats of violence to coerce three adult women and a 17-year-old girl to work as prostitutes was established beyond reasonable doubt that he knew the women continued to work as prostitutes because they believed he would harm them or members of their family if they quit.