United States v. Crawford - 520 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2008)

Rule:

In analyzing whether a prior conviction qualifies as a prior predicate controlled substance offense for purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1, the sentencing court must first use the categorical approach. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statute of conviction. If the statute is facially over-inclusive, the court employs the modified categorical approach. Under the modified categorical approach, the prior offense may qualify as a career offender predicate offense if documentation or judicially noticeable facts clearly establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes. The government has the burden to establish clearly and unequivocally that the conviction was based on all of the elements of a qualifying predicate offense. Where the prior conviction was based on a guilty plea, the sentencing court's review is limited to those documents made or used in adjudicating guilt such as the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or the transcript of the colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.

Facts:

Crawford was convicted by a jury of two counts of distribution of heroin and distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment, six years of supervised release, a $ 1,000 fine and a $ 100 special penalty assessment. The district court found that he was a "career offender" under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. Crawford appealed.

Issue:

Did the district court err in its determination that Crawford qualified as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court held that Crawford’s argument based on the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine was irrelevant because he conceded during his re-sentencing hearing that the disparity did not actually affect his sentencing level. Because the court found Crawford to be a career offender, the base offense level calculation would have been the same regardless of the powder cocaine versus crack cocaine distinction. The district court did not presume the reasonableness of a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sentence with respect to Crawford’s case but, rather, presciently forecasted the holding of a U.S. Supreme Court case that a within-Guidelines sentence was presumptively reasonable on appeal. In light of the advisory Guidelines and the relevant sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553, the district court committed no error in its thorough and sympathetic consideration of Crawford’s case. The district court was correct in its determination that Crawford qualified as a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. A California offense was sufficiently evidenced by a guilty plea form signed by Crawford.