United States v. Deaton - 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003)

Rule:

Congress passed the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq., to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a), and gave the United States Army Corps of Engineers, along with the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the job of getting this done. The Corps has pursued this goal by regulating nonnavigable tributaries and their adjacent wetlands. This use of delegated authority is well within Congress' traditional power over navigable waters.

Facts:

Plaintiff United States sued defendant property owners under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 et seq., for failing to obtain a permit before digging a ditch and depositing excavated dirt in wetlands on their property. The defendants argued that the CWA cannot be read to extend United States Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction to their wetlands or the roadside ditch and that if the Act did extend that far, Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The district court denied the motion to reconsider the CWA jurisdiction and entered a remediation order. The defendants appealed. 

Issue:

1. Did the Congress’ power to protect navigable waters allow it to regulate the discharge of pollutants that flow into the ditch? 
2. Could the CWA be read to extend to the United States Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction to tributaries of navigable waters? 

Answer:

1) Yes. 2) Yes.

Conclusion:

The Court noted that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to protect navigable waters allowed it to regulate the discharge of pollutants that flowed into the ditch in order to prevent the use of navigable waters for injurious purposes. Congress delegated part of this authority to the United States Army Corps of Engineers in the CWA. The Corps, in turn, promulgated 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5) that extended CWA jurisdiction to tributaries of navigable waters. That regulation represented a reasonable interpretation of the CWA that was entitled to Chevron deference. The Corps interpreted its regulation to cover the roadside ditch, and the appellate court also deferred to that interpretation. The appellate court also held that the district court did not err when it decided that the Corps used an appropriate indicator for wetland hydrology (prescribed by its Wetlands Delineation Manual) in designating parts of the owners' property as wetlands. Finally, the district court's remediation order, which required the owners to fill in the ditch and restore their wetlands to their pre-violation condition, was affirmed given that the owners' remediation proposal would likely have compounded the environmental damage.