United States v. Jones - 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997)

Rule:

Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, time spent in home detention does not constitute a sentence of imprisonment.

Facts:

Appellant Kathleen Jones stole a credit card application from the mailbox of her son-in-law's aunt and uncle, fraudulently applied for the credit card under their names, and made twenty charges on the credit card between July 8, 1991, and July 21, 1991, for ATM withdrawals and hotel visits. Appellant was convicted of one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; two counts of using a fictitious or false name in order to carry on a scheme to defraud by mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1342; one count of using an unauthorized access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2); one count of possessing stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; and one count of obstruction of correspondence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1702. Appellant challenged her conviction, contending that the district court erred in admitting the card because Cronin, a lay witness, was not familiar with her signature. Appellant also argued that the expert testimony was inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), because it was not sufficiently reliable. In addition, appellant contended that the district court miscalculated her criminal history score under the United States Sentencing Guidelines by counting as a prior "sentence of imprisonment" a sentence she served in home detention pursuant to Tennessee's Community Alternatives to Prison Program. 

Issue:

1. Did the district court err in admitting the evidence in this case, i.e., the card and the expert testimony? 
2. Did the district court err in counting as a prior "sentence of imprisonment" a sentence appellant served in home detention? 

Answer:

1) No. 2) Yes.

Conclusion:

The court affirmed the convictions, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a card identified by appellant's son-in-law as written by appellant, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2). The witness testified that he knew appellant wrote the note because it disclosed knowledge of facts known by appellant. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting expert in light of his training, job responsibilities, his years of practical experience and the detailed nature of his testimony. The court held that handwriting analysis was a field of expertise and that the testimony was admissible as non-scientific expert testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. The court reversed the enhancement of appellant's sentence based on time she served in home detention and remanded for resentencing. The court held that home detention did not constitute a sentence of imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines.