United States v. Maynulet - 68 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2010)

Rule:

The question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law, and thus, review is de novo. Generally, a military judge has substantial discretionary power to decide whether to issue a jury instruction. However, a military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct on an affirmative defense if reasonably raised. R.C.M. 916(d), 920(e)(3), Manual Courts-Martial. A military judge has that duty even if the instruction was not requested. The test whether an affirmative defense is reasonably raised is whether the record contains some evidence to which the court members may attach credit if they so desire.

Facts:

Appellant Rogelio M. Maynulet commanded an armor company in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In May 2004, appellant and his company were instructed to set up a traffic control point to support an operation to capture or kill a high-value target (HVT). A vehicle transporting the HVT sped past the check point. After a high-speed chase the vehicle carrying the HVT crashed into a wall and then into a nearby house. Appellant and several soldiers approached the crash site. They saw that several doors of the vehicle were open, indicating the passengers may have fled inside the house. Appellant sent part of his team into the house to search for the target, ordered the medic to evaluate the wounded driver, and ordered another soldier to search the vehicle for weapons. Appellant received a radio communication that a detainee inside the house required medical attention and sent the medic inside the house. Appellant saw that the driver had a head wound, was making a gurgling sound, and was flapping his arm. The driver was laying inert on the ground and had no weapon nearby. Appellant made no attempt to aid the driver, nor did he attempt to contact his command. Several minutes passed. Appellant radioed his unit to stand by for friendly fire. He discharged two rounds at the driver's head. The first shot missed. Appellant then stepped back to take a second shot, which killed the driver. The general court-martial convicted appellant of assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter in violation of Unif. Code Mil. Justice, art. 134, 10 U.S.C.S. § 934. The court of criminal appeals affirmed.  Appellant then sought review and asserted the military judge erred by refusing to allow the members to determine whether mistake of law was a defense in his case.

Issue:

Did the military judge err when he refused to instruct the members on the defense of mistake of law?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court held that at trial the military judge rejected the defense request that the members be instructed on the defense of mistake of law. That was when appellant argued that he believed, albeit mistakenly, that he was acting in a manner consistent with the legal training he had received prior to deployment, and so was entitled to a mistake of law instruction because he was taught to ease suffering. However, the court held that the record was devoid of any erroneous pronouncement or interpretation of military law or the law of armed conflict upon which he could have reasonably relied to justify his killing of the injured driver. The court concluded that this Rules of Engagement card was unambiguous and appeared to supersede any argument about the general training. The court also rejected a defense of entrapment by estoppel. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision.