United States v. Thompson - 178 F. Supp. 3d 86 (W.D.N.Y. 2016)

Rule:

The  Due Process Clause does not give a criminal defendant the right to introduce irrelevant evidence.

Facts:

The Defendant has been charged in a four-count superseding indictment alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (sex trafficking either of minors or by force, fraud, or coercion) and § 1591(d) (obstruction or interference with enforcement of § 1591). The Government alleged that the Defendant "operated a commercial sex business in the Western New York area" and that, as part of that business, he "recruited women"—including the three victims in this case—"to work as prostitutes under his direction and control." The Government further alleged that the Defendant "used physical and/or psychological coercion to force the victims to engage in commercial sex acts and to give him the money they earned." Jury selection is scheduled to begin on April 6, 2016. The Government has filed a motion in limine requesting five forms of relief. The Government first asked for an order prohibiting the Defendant "from eliciting or presenting any evidence concerning [the] victims' sexual behavior, including prostitution, prior to and subsequent to the time period" at issue in the superseding indictment. The Government's second motion is related to its first: the Government asks for permission "to introduce evidence of sexual behavior and prostitution by the victims, including sexual relations with the defendant, during the time period charged" in the superseding indictment. (emphasis in original). Third, the Government sought to introduce evidence of uncharged criminal activity (described more fully below) in which the Defendant allegedly engaged. In the Government's view, this evidence "explains the 'climate of fear' created by the defendant" and it "provides the jury with the background and history" of the Defendant's relationship with the victims. Fourth, the Government seeks a protective order prohibiting either party from disclosing the victims' full names. Finally, the Government moved to allow Victim 3, who is under 18 years old, to testify via closed-circuit television. As an initial matter, Rule 412(a) prohibits the Defendant from introducing or eliciting evidence concerning the victims' sexual behavior (including prostitution) that occurred prior and subsequent to the time periods at issue in the superseding indictment. The only exception relevant here is Rule 412(b)(1)(C), which allows a criminal defendant to introduce otherwise-inadmissible evidence of a victim's "other sexual behavior" if "exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights." The Defendant identifies two constitutional rights that, in his view, would be violated by excluding such evidence: his Fifth Amendment right to present a defense, and his Sixth Amendment right under the Confrontation Clause.

Issue:

Does barring evidence of the victims' pre- and post-indictment sexual activity violate the Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights?

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court held that barring evidence of the victims' pre- and post-indictment sexual activity does not violate the Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to present a defense. Evidence of the victims' pre- and post-indictment sexual behavior would be irrelevant (and, therefore, inadmissible) in this case because it does not tend to "make . . . more or less probable" any fact which the Government must prove under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Fed. R. Evid. 401. Accordingly, Rule 412(b)(1)(C)'s exception to Rule 412(a) does not apply. Additionally, barring evidence of the victims' pre- and post-indictment sexual activity does not violate the Defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. Prohibiting the Defendant from attempting to impeach the victims with evidence protected by Rule 412(a) does not mean that the Defendant cannot attempt to impeach the victims at all; it simply means that certain areas of impeachment are off-limits. This limit does not violate the Confrontation Clause, which guarantees only "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Accordingly, Rule 412(b)(1)(C)'s exception to Rule 412(a) does not apply.