United States v. Tomko - 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009)

Rule:

The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both procedural and substantive reasonableness inquiries of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. For example, an abuse of discretion has occurred if a district court based its decision on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion. This also means that, absent any significant procedural error, the court must give due deference to the district court's determination that the 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the sentence. In other words, if the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.

Facts:

William Tomko pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Tomko was the owner and Chief Executive Officer of W.G. Tomko & Son, Inc. ("Tomko, Inc."), a plumbing contractor. Using the 1997 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the district court calculated Tomko's total offense level to be thirteen and his criminal history category to be I. Based on these calculations, the Guidelines recommended a range of imprisonment between twelve and eighteen months and a fine between $ 3,000 and $ 30,000. Tomko, however, proposed that in light of the then-recent Hurricane Katrina catastrophe and his construction expertise, the Court should sentence him to probation and home detention, and require him to work for Habitat for Humanity. The Executive Director for Habitat for Humanity's Pittsburgh affiliate testified that the organization would appreciate Tomko's help in its efforts to rebuild the Gulf Coast and that Tomko had performed well in past projects, including providing onsite assistance and advice. Tomko submitted a Motion for Downward Departure. The motion argued that Tomko should be sentenced below his Guidelines range because 1) his incarceration could cause Tomko, Inc.'s innocent employees to lose their jobs; 2) he has performed exceptional charitable acts and good works; 3) he has demonstrated an extraordinary degree of acceptance of responsibility; and 4) a combination of these three factors. As exhibits, Tomko attached over fifty letters from family, friends, community leaders, and others attesting to his pre-indictment charitable activities and other good works. The district court found that a sentence mitigated by the factors of 3553 is warranted. The district court sentenced Tomko to three years of probation (the first of which would be served as home detention), participation in an alcohol treatment program, 250 hours of community service, full restitution, and the statutory maximum fine of $ 250,000. The Government appealed. 

Issue:

Did the district court properly determine that a sentence mitigated by the factors of 3553 is warranted?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

The United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a range of imprisonment between 12 and 18 months and a fine between $ 3,000 and $ 30,000. Affirming, the court determined that the sentencing judge listened to each argument and rejected the ones the Government made concerning general deterrence. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the district court explicitly examined the subsections of 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553. The variance from the Guidelines range took into account defendant's negligible criminal history, his employment record, his community ties, and his extensive charitable works as reasons for not incarcerating him, while also factoring in his substantial wealth as a reason for imposing a fine far above the Guidelines range. Indeed, the district court provided more than just a boilerplate recitation of the § 3553(a) factors; it detailed, step-by-step, its individualized assessment of the sentence that it believed appropriate in defendant's particular case. Noting the deference due to the district court's sentencing decision, the court concluded that the district court's reasons were also logical and consistent with the factors set forth in § 3553(a).