United States v. Udeagu - 110 F.R.D. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)

Rule:

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, as well as Fed. R. Evid. 410, preclude the use of evidence of incriminating statements made in connection with a guilty plea which is later withdrawn, to impeach a defendant.

Facts:

Defendant Christopher Udeagu has been charged with the knowing and intentional importation of heroin and of possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a)(1), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(A), 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Defendant pled guilty to one count of illegal importation of heroin. At the time of his plea, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant, under oath with his counsel present and advising him, freely admitted his guilt and described his participation in detail on the record. Subsequently, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, principally on the ground that he was not in fact guilty. This motion was granted. Defendant has moved for a ruling in limine on whether the government, to impeach the credibility of defendant should he take the stand, can use the statements made by him during his plea allocution. Such evidence would be introduced by the government on cross-examination should defendant elect to take the stand in his own defense since his testimony would have to be inconsistent with his admission under oath at the time his guilty plea was received.

Issue:

Under the circumstances, could the government use the statements made by the defendant during his plea allocution to impeach defendant’s credibility? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court granted defendant’s motion in limine, holding that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, as well as Fed. R. Evid. 410, precluded the use of evidence of incriminating statements made in connection with a guilty plea which was later withdrawn, to impeach defendant. The reason was clear - the incriminatory admissions would make withdrawal of the plea nugatory since conviction would almost surely result from a trial. The court further found that the court itself impliedly promised defendant that his statements could be used only in a perjury or false statement proceedings. Should defendant elect to take the witness stand during his trial and testify contrary to the inculpatory statements made under oath at his plea allocution, the court found that there would be prima facie grounds for a prosecution for perjury.