Waldman v. PLO - 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016)

Rule:

To exercise personal jurisdiction lawfully, three requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff's service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper. Second, there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective. Third, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process principles.

Facts:

Eleven American families sued the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") and the Palestinian Authority ("PA") (collectively, "defendants") under the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), for various terror attacks in Israel that killed or wounded the plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants ("plaintiffs") or their family members. The defendants repeatedly argued before the District Court for the Southern District of New York that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in light of their minimal presence in, and the lack of any nexus between the facts underlying the plaintiffs' claims and the United States. The district court concluded that it had general personal jurisdiction over the defendants, even after the Supreme Court narrowed the test for general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014). After a seven-week trial, a jury found that the defendants, acting through their employees, perpetrated the attacks and that the defendants knowingly provided material support to organizations designated by the United States State Department as foreign terrorist organizations. The jury awarded the plaintiffs damages of $218.5 million, an amount that was trebled automatically pursuant to the ATA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), bringing the total award to $655.5 million. The defendants appealed, arguing that the United States Constitution precluded the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them

Issue:

Did the district court have general personal jurisdiction over the defendants? 

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court held that the district court erred when it concluded it had general jurisdiction over two Palestinian entities with respect to the Anti-Terrorism Act claims brought on behalf of individuals and family members injured or killed in attacks in Israel where the entities' maintenance of an office in the United States, promoting the Palestinian cause in speeches and media appearances, and retaining a lobbying firm did not render the entities essentially at home in the United States. The court further held that the district court lacked specific jurisdiction over the entities where the terror attacks at issue were not expressly aimed at the United States, the deaths and injuries suffered by the American plaintiffs in those attacks were random and fortuitous, and the lobbying activities regarding American policy toward Israel were insufficiently suit-related conduct.