Weirs v. Jones Cty. - 80 Iowa 351, 45 N.W. 883 (1890)

Rule:

The liability of a county for the defective condition of its bridges is analogous to that of municipal corporations with respect to their streets and sidewalks. A municipal corporation is liable for a defect in its sidewalk of which it has actual notice in time to repair it, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, before the accident for which it is sought to be held liable, or, if the defect was of such a nature, or had existed for such a period of time, as that, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of its duties, it would have learned of its existence in time to prevent the injury. 

Facts:

The bridge in question was a county bridge, and that it was known to the board of supervisors of Jones City to be in an unsafe condition prior to the time of its falling. About the fourth day of September, 1888, the board caused it to be examined and condemned. By authority and direction of the board, signboards bearing, in large letters, the words "Bridge unsafe" were prepared; and, on the fifth day of September, 1888, one was nailed up at each end of the bridge, in a conspicuous place. In addition, at one end of the bridge two wires were stretched across the bridge at about the height of the breast of a horse, and securely fastened to the sides by means of staples; and a wire was stretched and fastened in a similar manner at the other end of the bridge. The bridge was in an isolated place, and was used but little. On the ninth day of September, 1888, Weirs crossed the bridge in the morning without accident. The signs were then on the bridge, and the wires were there, but loosened at one end, and thrown to one side, in such a manner as not to form any obstruction to the crossing of the bridge. Weirs claimed that he could not read English, and that he did not see the signs nor the wires, and did not know the condition of the bridge, not having been to it for a year before. On his return in the evening the bridge fell while he was on it with his team, and as a result his horses were killed, and the wagon was damaged. He thus filed an action for damages. 

During the trial, the court gave this instruction to the jury: "7. It was the duty of the defendant, when it knew the bridge was unsafe, to give such notice thereof to the public as would be effective, or, if obstructions and notices were both relied upon, they should be such, taken together, as would be effective; and it would also be the duty of the defendant to see that such notices and obstructions were kept and continued there in such manner as would be sufficient to inform a person exercising ordinary care of the unsafe condition of said bridge. Hence, if you find from the evidence that the notices put on the ends of said bridge, and the wires placed across the ends thereof, were not reasonably sufficient to notify a person exercising ordinary care of the unsafe condition of said bridge, or if, after the same were placed there, they were not kept or continued there by defendant in such manner as to be reasonably sufficient to notify a person exercising ordinary care of the unsafe condition of said bridge; and, if you further find from the evidence that the plaintiff, without any notice of its unsafe condition, and without fault or negligence on his part, drove onto the bridge, and was injured,--then defendant would be liable." Jones City complained of this instruction on the ground that it makes defendant responsible for damages which resulted from its failure to continue and maintain the notices and obstructions, even though it used ordinary and reasonable care to do so. Regardless, the district court held Jones City liable for the incident.

Issue:

Did the district court err in imputing liability on Jones City?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

Ordinary care is required of such corporations in barricading dangerous places,--as excavations in its streets. If a barricade so erected is removed without the consent or knowledge of the corporation, it is not liable for damages which result from its removal, unless it has notice of such removal, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known it in time to have prevented the accident. In this case, the district court made Jones City liable for the continued maintenance of the barrier, even though it was removed without fault on its part, and so short a time before the accident as to prevent its acquiring knowledge of the fact. This was erroneous. The defendant was required to use the care which might be expected of a prudent and reasonably diligent person, under similar circumstances, in the management of his own affairs.