Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. - 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018)

Rule:

The Administrative Procedure Act creates a basic presumption of judicial review for one suffering legal wrong because of agency action. 5 U.S.C.S. § 702. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, legal lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequence. That is why the Supreme Court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. The presumption may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review, 5 U.S.C.S. § 701(a)(1), or if the action is “committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C.S. § 701(a)(2). 

Facts:

The Fish and Wildlife Service administers the Endangered Species Act of 1973 on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. In 2001, the Service listed the dusky gopher frog as an endangered species which required the Service to designate “critical habitat” for the frog. The Service proposed designating as part of that critical habitat a site in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, which the Service dubbed “Unit 1.” The frog had once lived in Unit 1, but the land had long been used as a commercial timber plantation, and no frogs had been spotted there for decades. The Service concluded that Unit 1 met the statutory definition of unoccupied critical habitat because its rare, high-quality breeding ponds and distance from existing frog populations made it essential for the species' conservation. §1532(5)(A)(ii). The Service then commissioned a report on the probable economic impact of its proposed critical-habitat designation. §1533(b)(2). With regard to Unit 1, the report found that designation might bar future development of the site, depriving the owners of up to $33.9 million. The Service nonetheless concluded that the potential costs were not disproportionate to the conservation benefits and proceeded to designate Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Unit 1 is owned by petitioner Weyerhaeuser and a group of family landowners. The owners of Unit 1 sued, contending that the closed-canopy timber plantation on Unit 1 could not be critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog, which lives in open-canopy forests. The District Court upheld the designation. The landowners also challenged the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 from the frog's critical habitat, arguing that the Service had failed to adequately weigh the benefits of designating Unit 1 against the economic impact, had used an unreasonable methodology for estimating economic impact, and had failed to consider several categories of costs. The District Court approved the Service's methodology and declined to consider the challenge to the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the suggestion that the “critical habitat” definition contains any habitability requirement and concluding that the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 was committed to agency discretion by law and was therefore unreviewable.

Issue:

Did the court of appeals err in finding that the Service’s decision not to exclude Unit 1 from its designation as critical habitat under 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(2), based on economic impact and other relevant considerations, was not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The court held that the  U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's judgment affirming the district court's decision upholding the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's decision to designate Unit 1 in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog had to be vacated because “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act had to be "habitat" for an endangered species, the dusky gopher frog no longer lived in Unit 1, and the court of appeals had rejected the suggestion that the definition of "critical habitat" contained a habitability requirement. The court of appeals erred when it found that the Service’s decision not to exclude Unit 1 from its designation as critical habitat under 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(2), based on economic impact and other relevant considerations, was not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Administrative Procedure Act creates a basic presumption of judicial review for one suffering legal wrong because of agency action. 5 U.S.C.S. § 702. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, legal lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequence. That is why the Supreme Court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. The presumption may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review, 5 U.S.C.S. § 701(a)(1), or if the action is “committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C.S. § 701(a)(2).