Wheeler v. State - 135 A.3d 282 (Del. 2016)

Rule:

The United States Constitution specifies only two matters that must be "particularly described" in the warrant: "the place to be searched" and "the persons or things to be seized." Satisfying the particularity requirement is difficult in the electronic search warrant context, given the commingling of relevant and irrelevant information and the complexities of segregating responsive files ex ante. It would be folly for a search warrant to structure the mechanics of the search because imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives. Nonetheless, the requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that warrants that fail to describe the specific crime that has been or is being committed do not satisfy the particularity requirement. 

Facts:

In this direct appeal, Christopher Wheeler ("Wheeler") seeks to overturn his conviction of Dealing in Child Pornography. He raises two issues. First, he challenges a September 18, 2014 decision of the Superior Court denying his Amended and Superseding Motion to Suppress ("Motion to Suppress"). The Motion to Suppress sought to exclude evidence collected from Wheeler's home and office during a search executed pursuant to two warrants related to witness tampering. The challenged warrants covered Wheeler's entire digital universe and essentially had no limitations. In performing the search, officers seized 19 electronic devices and other digital media. Despite the broad, generalized language in the challenged warrants, the State found no evidence of witness tampering on any of Wheeler's devices. But when performing a cursory search of the data on an iMac found in Wheeler's piano room closet (the "iMac"), police discovered files containing child pornography. Wheeler contends that the search warrants were in the nature of "general warrants" and were overly broad in scope, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. Second, Wheeler appeals from a December 22, 2014 decision of the Superior Court denying his Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment of Acquittal ("Motion for Judgment of Acquittal"). Wheeler was charged with 25 identical counts of Dealing in Child Pornography based upon 25 images of child sexual exploitation—all of which were found on the iMac. Wheeler argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because the State could not establish that he was aware of the existence of the offending images in his "newsgroup cache." The State admits it has no proof that Wheeler ever viewed any of the images, which automatically "cached" on his computer, with no human intervention, as a result of his subscription to certain "newsgroups." Wheeler was sentenced to 50 years at Level V. Throughout these proceedings, Wheeler has asserted that the State utilized charges of witness tampering stemming from his admission in 2013 that he had molested two brothers in Pennsylvania in the 1980's as a pretext to search broadly for child pornography. The challenged warrants in this case are the witness tampering warrants—not the later-obtained child pornography warrant. But the State admits that the challenged witness tampering warrants were virtual copies of an off-the-shelf warrant for child pornography.

Issue:

Were the warrants in the nature of "general warrants" and were overly broad in scope, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2307(a)?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

The court held that Wheeler’s motion to suppress evidence collected from his home and office during a search executed pursuant to two warrants related to witness tampering was erroneously denied, as the warrants were in the nature of "general warrants" and were overly broad in scope, which violated U.S. Const. amend. IV, Del. Const. art. I, § 6, and Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 2307(a). The warrants did not satisfy the particularity requirement because they had no temporal limitations, despite that the officers had a more precise description of the alleged criminal activity and the time periods involved, and they permitted wide-ranging, exploratory searches which were unlawful.