Whetro v. Awkerman - 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970)

Rule:

An "act of God," whether it be a tornado, lightning, earthquake, or flood, is no longer a defense to a claim for a work-connected injury. Such a defense retains too much of the idea that an employer should not pay compensation unless the employer is somehow at fault. This concept from the law of torts is inconsistent with the law of workmen's compensation. The purpose of the Workman's Compensation Act as set forth in its title is to promote the welfare of the people of Michigan relating to the liability of employers for injuries or death sustained by employees. The legislative policy is to provide financial and medical benefits to victims of work-connected injuries in an efficient, dignified, and certain form. The Act allocates the burden of such payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of a product. Fault has nothing to do with whether or not compensation is payable. The economic impact on an injured workman and the workman's family is the same whether the injury is caused by an employer's fault or otherwise. The law in Michigan no longer requires the establishment of a proximately causal connection between employment and an injury to entitle a claimant to compensation. If employment is the occasion of an injury, even though not the proximate cause, compensation should be paid.

Facts:

While working for the employers, the employees were injured by a tornado. The employees were awarded workman's compensation in separate cases. The employers sought review, claiming that the tornado had been an act of God or an act of nature and the injuries caused by the tornado had not arisen "out of" the employment.

Issue:

Were the employees injured by a tornado while working for the employers entitled to a workman’s compensation?

Answer:

Yes.

Conclusion:

In rejecting the employers' argument, the court held that an act of God, whether it was a tornado, lightning, earthquake, or flood, was not a defense to a claim for a work-connected injury. The court held such a defense retained too much of the idea that an employer should not pay compensation unless the employer was somehow at fault. The court held the law in Michigan no longer required the establishment of a proximately causal connection between employment and an injury to entitle a claimant to compensation. As such, the court held the employees' injuries had arisen "out of" and in the course of employment because the employment had been the occasion of the injuries suffered.