Williams v. AG of Ala. - 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)

Rule:

In the abstract, there is no fundamental right to privacy or personal autonomy. Undoubtedly, many fundamental rights currently recognized under United States Supreme Court precedent touch on matters of personal autonomy and privacy. However, that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. Such rights have been denominated "fundamental" not simply because they implicate deeply personal and private considerations, but because they have been identified as deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.

Facts:

The Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act, Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.2 (2003), prohibited the sale of "sex toys”. Plaintiff civil liberties organization argued that the Act was an impermissible burden on a fundamental right to sexual privacy under the Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Defendant, the Attorney General of Alabama, challenged the district court’s decision. 

Issue:

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff?  

Answer:

No.

Conclusion:

The court reversed the district court's grant of the plaintiff organization's motion for summary judgment and remanded to the district court. The court held that no United States Supreme Court precedents were decisive on the question of the existence of such a right. Thus, the court was required to examine the right under the two-step Glucksberg analytical framework for evaluating new fundamental-rights claims. Under the first step, the court held that the "careful description" of the asserted right was the right to sell, buy, and use sexual devices. The court then held that the district court erred in its analysis of the second step--whether the right was deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition--because (1) the district court's framing of the asserted right and the historical analysis were overbroad; (2) the analysis placed too much weight on contemporary practice and attitudes; (3) the district court relied on a history of state non-interference with the right rather than the history and tradition of protection; and (4) the uncritical reliance on certain expert declarations in interpreting the historical record was flawed.