Woodstock v. City of Portland - No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116612 (D. Or. July 2, 2020)

Rule:

In deciding whether to grant a motion for TRO, courts look to substantially the same factors that apply to a court's decision on whether to issue a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction generally must show that: (1) he or she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he or she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his or her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 

Facts:

Plaintiffs Tuck Woodstock, Doug Brown, Sam Gehrke, Mathieu Lewis-Rolland, Kat Mahoney, and John Rudoff (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought this putative class action against the City of Portland (the "City") and numerous as-of-yet unnamed individual and supervisory officers of the Portland Police Bureau ("PPB") and other agencies allegedly working in concert with the PPB. As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs sought "to stop the Portland police from assaulting news reporters, photographers, legal observers, and other neutrals who are documenting the police's violent response to protests over the murder of George Floyd." Plaintiffs asserted that "[t]he police's efforts to intimidate the press and suppress reporting on the police's own misconduct offends fundamental constitutional protections and strikes at the core of our democracy."  Plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 8 and 26 of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages. 

Issue:

Should the motion for TRO be granted?

Answer:

Yes

Conclusion:

In addressing the requirements for granting a temporary restraining order, the Court found that, because Defendants have not yet entered a formal appearance or had a sufficient opportunity to respond to the allegations and evidence, it would be unfair at this time for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. There is, however, nothing unfair in the Court recognizing now that Plaintiffs have shown, at the minimum, serious questions going to the merits. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise II"), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986), the Supreme Court established a two-part test for right of access claims. First, the court must determine whether a right of access attaches to the government proceeding or activity by considering (1) whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.  Second, if the court determines that a qualified right applies, the government may overcome that right only by demonstrating "an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."  The public streets historically have been open to the press and general public, and public observation of police activities in the streets plays a significant positive role in ensuring conduct remains consistent with the Constitution. Further, there are at least serious questions regarding the police tactics directed toward journalists and other legal observers and whether restrictions placed upon them by the PPB are narrowly tailored. Next, anytime there is a serious threat to First Amendment rights, there is a likelihood of irreparable injury. Regarding the public interest, "[c]ourts considering requests for preliminary injunctions have consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First Amendment principles." Further, "it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights."  Finally, because Plaintiffs have "raised serious First Amendment questions," the balance of hardships "tips sharply in Plaintiffs' favor." Accordingly, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs' motion for TRO.