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COMPANY,

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. ADJ2123966 (SFO 0510193) (San Francisco District Office)

> OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

Applicant,

VS.

BIGGE CRANE & RIGGING COMPANY:

ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE

TOMMY GUTIERREZ,

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the April 29, 2015 Findings & Award of the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) who found that defendant's utilization review (UR) of a Request For Authorization (RFA) by applicant's treating physician Douglas Abeles, M.D., to provide the prescription medications Percocet and Norco was "untimely, due to defendant's failure to prove that the decision was communicated to the treating physician by phone, FAX or email within 24 hours of the decision." The WCJ further found that Dr. Abeles' request to provide the medications "is reasonable and necessary," and the medications were awarded along with reimbursement to applicant for self-procuring

It was previously stipulated that applicant sustained industrial injury to his back while working for defendant Bigge Crane & Rigging Company as a crane operator on August 8, 2008, causing permanent disability and need for future medical treatment.

Defendant contends that the evidence shows it timely communicated the UR decision to Dr. Abeles and the award of medical treatment is not justified.

An answer was not received from applicant.

The WCJ provided a Report And Recommendation On Petition For Reconsideration (Report) recommending that reconsideration be denied.

We have carefully reviewed the record and considered the allegations of defendant's petition for reconsideration and the WCJ's Report with respect thereto. For the reasons stated by the WCJ in her Report, which is adopted and incorporated by this reference except as discussed below, and for the reasons below, reconsideration is denied and the April 29, 2015 Findings & Award is affirmed.

Defendant did not establish at trial that the UR determinations were timely communicated to Dr. Abeles' office within 24 hours after the decisions were made as required by Administrative Director (AD) Rule 9792.9.2(e)(3). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9792.9.2(e)(3).) In accordance with the holding in Bodam v. San Bernardino County Dept. of Social Services (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 1519 (significant panel decision) (Bodam), a UR decision that is timely made but not timely communicated is invalid.¹ For that reason, the WCJ was authorized to award the requested medical treatment based upon her finding that applicant's use of the medications is supported by substantial medical evidence in light of the entire record.

The WCJ provides a summary of the background and explains the reasons for her decision in her Report by quoting from her Opinion on Decision, as follows:

Applicant is continuing to undergo treatment for his back with his primary treating physician (PTP), Dr. Abeles. Dr. Abeles faxed a Request for Authorization (RFA) to defendant on 01/23/2015 for medications, including Percocet and Norco (Exhibit 'A'). Said request for medications, Percocet and Norco, was denied by Utilization Review (UR) on 01/27/2015 (Exhibits 'G' and 'H.')...

The issue is whether the Utilization Review decision issued in a timely manner. In the WCAB en banc decision of [Dubon v. World Restoration, Inc. (2014) 79 Cal.Comp.Cases 1298 (Appeals Board en banc) (writ den.) (Dubon II)] the WCAB held,

1. 'A utilization review (UR) decision is invalid and not subject to independent medical review (IMR) only if it is untimely; and

Significant panel decisions are not binding precedent in workers' compensation proceedings; however, they are intended to augment the body of binding appellate court and en banc decisions and, therefore, a panel decision is not deemed "significant" unless, among other things: (1) it involves an issue of general interest to the workers' compensation community, especially a new or recurring issue about which there is little or no published case law; and (2) all Appeals Board members have reviewed the decision and agree that it is significant. (See Elliott v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 355, 361, fn. 3 [75 Cal.Comp.Cases 81]; Larch v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 64 Cal.Comp.Cases 1098, 1099-1100 (writ den.); 25 Cal. Workers' Comp. Rptr. 197 [News Brief, August 1997].)

2. If a UR decision is untimely, the determination of medical necessity may be made by the WCAB based on substantial medical evidence consistent with Labor Code section 4604.5'

In addition, in the WCAB Significant Panel Decision of [Bodam], the WCAB held the following per [Labor Code sections 4610(g)(1) and (g)(3)(A)] and [AD Rule 9792.9.1(e)(3) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9792.9.2(e)(3)]:

- '(1) A defendant is obligated to comply with all time requirements in conducting UR, including the timeframes for communicating the UR decision;
- (2) A UR decision that is timely made but is not timely communicated is untimely; and;
- (3) When a UR decision is untimely and, therefore, invalid, the necessity of the medical treatment at issue may be determined by the WCAB based upon substantial evidence.

[Labor Code Section 4610(g)(3)(a)], as well as [AD Rule 9792.9.1(e)(3) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 9792.9.2(e)(3)], cited above in the *Bodam* case provides:

'For prospective ... review, a decision to modify, delay, or deny shall be communicated to the requesting physician within 24 hours of the decision, and shall be communicated to the requesting physician initially by telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail.' (Emphasis added.)...

Applying the above stated law to the facts in this case, the question is whether defendant timely communicated the UR decision to the requesting physician within 24 hours of the UR decision. Defendant produced Exhibit 'E' as evidence that they had complied with this requirement.

There is no document entered into evidence from the UR physician, Dr. Dao claiming that he communicated the UR decision to the PTP Dr. Abeles within the 24 hour period requirement. Instead, Exhibit 'E' is a letter dated 01/27/2015 from the primary treating physician's assistant, Marc Munoz to Zurich. The totality of the body of contents of the letter state:

'At this time we spoke with Dr. Dao for Utilization Review regarding Mr. Gutierrez's use of his medications. All information was provided to the best of my knowledge; however, we will have to await Dr. Dao's report.' (Emphasis added.)

This paragraph is followed by the standard [Labor Code section 5703] disclosure statement. The document is signed by Dr. Abeles' physician's assistant, Marc Munoz. The letter is not signed by the PTP, Dr. Abeles, nor is it signed or acknowledged in any way by the UR reviewing physician.

Unfortunately, although this does appear to be a good faith attempt by defendant to confirm a timely communication of the UR decision to the requesting physician Dr. Abeles, it falls short on several levels:

- (a) There is no statement in the letter that the Utilization Review decision was, in fact, communicated from the UR physician Dr. Dao to the PTP Dr. Abeles, which is what the law requires. The letter merely explains that 'we' discussed the use of the applicant's medications. This could have been a conversation about the PTP's reasoning for his RFA. This interpretation is bolstered by the second line of the 2 sentence note stating, 'All information was provided to the best of my knowledge; however, we will have to await Dr. Dao's report.' This could easily be interpreted as that the PTP's staff had provided all information to the UR reviewer so that he could approve the request for medication, but that the PTP's staff would have to wait for Dr. Dao's report to see if indeed Dr. Dao was convinced of the need for the medication and would approve it as recommended by the PTP. This seems a more likely interpretation of these 2 lines, than that the final UK decision had been communicated to the PTP. decision had been communicated, as argued by defendant, why would the PTP's staff need to await the UR Reviewer Dr. Dao's report?
- (b) The letter doesn't identify who 'we' are. There is no explanation as to exactly who talked to the UR physician Dr. Dao. Did both Mr. Munoz and Dr. Abeles talk to Dr. [Dao] together, in a conference call? Did only Mr. Munoz talk to Dr. Dao? If the latter is true, the mandatory legal requirement that the UR decision be communicated to Dr. Abeles has not been met.
- (c) Next, the letter is not signed by the primary treating physician, Dr. Abeles, who is the person required to receive the UR decision. The letter is signed by the physician's assistant, Mr. Munoz. Therefore, Mr. Munoz and not Dr. Abeles, is the one making the assertions. It is not clear, but from reading this letter, however, it appears that Dr. Dao talked to Mr. Munoz who communicated the information about 'use of applicant's medications' to Dr. Abeles. (And again, the information communicated is not specifically identified, so we have no way of knowing if the PTP was told of the UR denial within the 24 hour mandatory period.)

For the above reasons, Exhibit 'E,' the letter from Marc Muno[z] to Zurich, does not constitute substantial evidence to prove that the UR denial was communicated to Dr. Abeles within 24 hours of the UR decision. Therefore, consistent with the *Bodam* case, the defense has failed in their burden of proof on this issue.

Based on the above, the Utilization Review decision is deemed untimely, and the WCAB may take jurisdiction over medical treatment dispute. See

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[Dubon, supra.]" (Bracketed citations and material substituted, emphasis in original.)

DISCUSSION

The record shows that the January 27, 2015 UR determinations timely issued within five days after Dr. Abeles submitted the RFAs in accordance with the applicable AD Rule. However, as discussed by the WCJ in her Report, defendant did not show that notice of the UR determinations was timely communicated to Dr. Abeles' office within 24 hours after they were made as required by AD Rule 9792.9.1(e)(3). In that regard, we do not adopt the WCJ's view as expressed in her Report that a defendant must show that a UR determination was communicated directly to the treating physician and it was not defendant's obligation to make that showing in this case. The reason the WCJ was authorized to hear and decide the medical treatment dispute is because defendant did not show that the UR determinations were communicated in any form to Dr. Abeles' office within 24 hours after they were made as required by AD Rule 9792.9.1(e)(3) and the holding in *Bodam*.

Defendant cites the January 27, 2015 letter from Dr. Abeles' physician assistant, Mark Munoz, to the insurer as evidence that the UR determinations were timely communicated to applicant's treating physician. (Exhibit E.) However, the letter makes *no* mention of the UR determinations and refers only to a conversation about applicant's "use of his medications." We do not agree with the WCJ that the letter evidences "a good faith attempt by defendant to confirm a timely communication of the UR decision to the requesting physician Dr. Abeles." Instead, the letter and the UR determinations support the conclusion that the conversation referenced in Exhibit E occurred *before* the final UR determinations were made.

In the January 27, 2015 letter, Mr. Munoz wrote that "we will have to await" receipt of the written UR determinations by Dr. Dao. As the WCJ wrote in her Report, "If the [UR] decision had been communicated, as argued by defendant, why would the PTP's staff need to await the UR Reviewer Dr. Dao's report?" The answer to that question is apparent. There would be no need to "await" the UR report if the UR determination had been communicated by Dr. Dao to Mr. Munoz during the January 27, 2015 conversation referenced in Exhibit E.

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Moreover, on page 2 of each of the January 27, 2015 UR determinations (Exhibits F, G, H and I), Dr. Dao described his conversation with Mr. Munoz on that date, writing as follows:

> I spoke to PA Mark at 4:35 PM PT today after the AP's office had called back. He stated that he does not know that much about this claimant[']s clinical status. He noted that claimant has taken multiple narcotic medications but that there has not been any documentation of significant benefit from these medications. My denial for medications will not be changed after the above discussion.

The above-described evidence shows that the January 27, 2015 conversation between Mr. Munoz and Dr. Dao referenced in Exhibit E occurred before the final UR determinations were made by Dr. Dao. In sum, defendant did not meet its burden of showing that the UR determinations were timely communicated to the office of applicant's primary treating physician within 24 hours as required by AD Rule 9792.9.1(e)(3) and the holding in Bodam.

We also find that the WCJ's award of the medications is supported by substantial medical evidence. A review of the numerous reports by Dr. Abeles and others that are in evidence demonstrates that applicant appropriately used the medications at issue to relieve his chronic pain, consistent with the MTUS guidelines referenced in the UR determinations.

By way of example, on page two of one of the February 4, 2013 report by Dr. Abeles (Defendant's Exhibit W), the physician wrote that he discussed the potential toxicity of Norco and Percocet with applicant "in detail" and that "He knows to stay compliant with his medication regimen." Applicant's participation in urinalysis "to insure compliance of medication usage" was also documented in that report. The continuation of that approach is further documented on page two of Dr. Abeles March 6, 2013 report (Defendant's Exhibit W), and in all his other reports from 2013 to 2015.

On page two of his August 25, 2014 report (Defendant's Exhibit R), Dr. Abeles explains why applicant "will continue his current pain medication regimen," writing that, "His pain medication provides modest pain relief, allowing him to remain functional. He is not experiencing any intolerable side effects."

More recently, in his report of February 6, 2015 (Defendant's Exhibit M), Dr. Abeles discusses applicant's continuing use of Norco and Percocet. With regard to the Norco, Dr. Abeles wrote, "I am

keeping close control on his medication use and will periodically checking [sic] his CURES reports and having ongoing discussions with the pharmacy to insure he is maintaining his treatment protocol."

On page two of his April 3, 2015 report (Applicant's Exhibit 9), Dr. Abeles discusses applicant's condition and the treatment plan. He explains that applicant "is still suffering from chronic low back pain due to his previous surgery, degenerative disc disease, and the 4.0 mm disc herniation at the L5-S1 level causing ongoing back pain and radicular symptoms in his leg." Dr. Abeles discusses the need for a pain management physician located closer to applicant's residence, and he notes that he is "attempting to slowly wean [applicant] off of the Norco and Percocet," although he continued to prescribe them for "breakthrough pain."

The medical reporting in evidence shows that applicant's use of Norco and Percocet to relieve his pain is not inconsistent with the MTUS guidelines referenced in the UR determinations. As expressed in the MTUS guidelines as quoted in the UR determinations (Defendant's Exhibits F-I), the use of such medications requires "Ongoing review and documentation of pain relief, functional status, appropriate medication use, and side effects." Dr. Doa's statement in the UR determinations that "there has not been any documentation of significant benefit from these medications" is contradicted by the several reports of primary treating physician Dr. Abeles that are in evidence.

In light of the substantial medical evidence demonstrating applicant's appropriate use of the medications to relieve the effects of his industrial injury, the WCJ's decision that they should continue to be provided as reasonable medical treatment was correct. The April 29, 2015 decision is affirmed.

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's petition for reconsideration of the April 29, 2015 Findings & Award of the workers' compensation administrative law judge is **DENIED**. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD I CONCUR, RINE ZALEWSKI DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA JUL 2 0 2015 SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD. TOMMY GUTIERREZ **SMITH & BALTAXE** MULLEN & FILIPPI JFS/abs

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

TOMMY GUTIERREZ

Applicant,

V.

CASE NO. ADJ2123966

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BIGGIE CRANE & RIGGING CO.

Defendant.

DOCUMENT #2 BEGINS HERE

I. INTRODUCTION

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1. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER:

Defendant

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2. DATE & TYPE OF INJURY:

Specific injury to low back on 1/8/2008

3. TIMELINESS:

Petition was timely filed.

4. **VERIFICATION**:

A verification is attached.

5. **DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS**:

- The WCJ erred by finding the UR decision untimely as it had not been properly communicated to the primary treating physician.
- The WCJ erred by finding that a letter from the PTP's physician's assistant to the carrier memorializing a conversation he had with the UR physician, Dr. Dao. "regarding Mr. Gutierrez's use of his medications" (Exhibit E) did not constitute communication of the UR decision to the PTP within 24 hours of the decision as mandated by LC 4610(g)(3)(a), as well as 8 CCR 9792.9.1(e)(3), 8 CCR.
- The WCJ erred by awarding reimbursement of the self-procured medical treatment out-of-pocket costs of Hydrocodone/Norco in the amount of \$115.

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II. <u>DISCUSSION - RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION</u>

I addressed defendant's contentions in my Opinion on Decision which is set forth below (with some minor tweaks added):

"OPINION ON DECISION

This case deals with an admitted back injury suffered by Mr. Tommy Gutierrez on 01/08/2008. The basic facts are not in dispute. The case settled with two Stipulations and Requests for Award dated 09/03/2009 and 06/22/2010, ultimately awarding 20% permanent disability with future medical treatment. Said awards for medical treatment are still ongoing.

I. **Factual Summary**

Applicant is continuing to undergo treatment for his back with his primary treating physician (PTP), Dr. Abeles. Dr. Abeles faxed a Request for Authorization (RFA) to defendant on 01/23/2015 for medications, including Percocet and Norco (Exhibit "A"). Said request for medications, Percocet and Norco, was denied by Utilization Review (UR) on 01/27/2015 (Exhibits "G" and "H.")

Statement of the Issue - Is the UR decision Untimely?: II.

The issue is whether the Utilization Review decision issued in a timely manner. In the WCAB en banc decision of Dubon v. World Restoration; SCIF, (2014) 79 Cal Comp Cases 1298, the WCAB held.

- 1. "A utilization review (UR) decision is invalid and not subject to independent medical review (IMR) only if it is untimely; and
- 2. If a UR decision is untimely, the determination of medical necessity may be made by the WCAB based on substantial medical evidence consistent with Labor Code section 4604.5"

In addition, in the WCAB Significant Panel Decision of Bodam v. San Bernardino County/Department of Social Services (2014) 79 Cal Comp Cases 1519, the WCAB held the following per LC 4610(g)(1) and (g)(3)(A) and 8 CCR 9792.9.1(e)(3):

GUTIERREZ, TOMMY – ADJ2123966

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- "(1) A defendant is obligated to comply with all time requirements in conducting UR, including the timeframes for communicating the UR decision;
- (2) A UR decision that is timely made but is not timely communicated is untimely; and;
- (3) When a UR decision is untimely and, therefore, invalid, the necessity of the medical treatment at issue may be determined by the WCAB based upon substantial evidence.

Labor Code Section 4610(g)(3)(a), as well as 8 CCR 9792.9.1(e)(3), cited above in the *Bodam* case provides:

"For prospective ... review, a decision to modify, delay, or deny shall be communicated to the <u>requesting physician</u> within 24 hours of the decision, and shall be communicated to the requesting physician initially by telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail." (Emphasis added.)

III. Was the UR Denial Communicated to PTP Dr. Abeles within 24 hours?

Applying the above stated law to the facts in this case, the question is whether defendant timely communicated the UR decision to the requesting physician within 24 hours of the UR decision. Defendant produced Exhibit "E" as evidence that they had complied with this requirement.

There is no document entered into evidence from the UR physician, Dr. Dao claiming that he communicated the UR decision to the PTP Dr. Abeles within the 24 hour period requirement. Instead, Exhibit "E" is a letter dated 01/27/2015 from the primary treating physician's assistant, Marc Munoz to Zurich. The totality of the body of contents of the letter state:

"At this time we spoke with Dr. Dao for Utilization Review regarding Mr. Gutierrez's use of his medications. All information was provided to the best of my knowledge; however, we will have to await Dr. Dao's report." (Emphasis added.)

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This paragraph is followed by the standard LC 5703 disclosure statement. The document is signed by Dr. Abeles' physician's assistant, Marc Munoz. The letter is not signed by the PTP, Dr. Abeles, nor is it signed or acknowledged in any way by the UR reviewing physician.

Unfortunately, although this does appear to be a good faith attempt by defendant to confirm a timely communication of the UR decision to the requesting physician Dr. Abeles, it falls short on several levels:

- (a) There is no statement in the letter that the Utilization Review decision was, in fact, communicated from the UR physician Dr. Dao to the PTP Dr. Abeles, which is what the law requires. The letter merely explains that "we" discussed the use of the applicant's medications. This could have been a conversation about the PTP's reasoning for his RFA. This interpretation is bolstered by the second line of the 2 sentence note stating, "All information was provided to the best of my knowledge; however, we will have to await Dr. Dao's report." This could easily be interpreted as that the PTP's staff had provided all information to the UR reviewer so that he could approve the request for medication, but that the PTP's staff would have to wait for Dr. Dao's report to see if indeed Dr. Dao was convinced of the need for the medication and would approve it as recommended by the PTP. This seems a more likely interpretation of these 2 lines, than that the final UR decision had been communicated to the PTP. If the decision had been communicated, as argued by defendant, why would the PTP's staff need to await the UR Reviewer Dr. Dao's report?
- (b) The letter doesn't identify who "we" are. There is no explanation as to exactly who talked to the UR physician Dr. Dao. Did both Mr. Munoz and Dr. Abeles talk to Dr. Doa together, in a conference call? Did only Mr. Munoz talk to Dr. Dao? If the latter

is true, the mandatory legal requirement that the UR decision be communicated to Dr. Abeles has not been met.

(c) Next, the letter is not signed by the primary treating physician, Dr. Abeles, who is the person required to receive the UR decision. The letter is signed by the physician's assistant, Mr. Munoz. Therefore, Mr. Munoz and not Dr. Abeles, is the one making the assertions. It is not clear, but from reading this letter, however, it appears that Dr. Dao talked to Mr. Munoz who communicated the information about "use of applicant's medications" to Dr. Abeles. (And again, the information communicated is not specifically identified, so we have no way of knowing if the PTP was told of the UR denial within the 24 hour mandatory period.)

For the above reasons, Exhibit "E," the letter from Marc Munos to Zurich, does not constitute substantial evidence to prove that the UR denial was communicated to Dr. Abeles within 24 hours of the UR decision. Therefore, consistent with the *Bodam* case, the defense has failed in their burden of proof on this issue.

Based on the above, the Utilization Review decision is deemed untimely, and the WCAB may take jurisdiction over medical treatment dispute. See *Dubon v. World Restoration*; *SCIF*, (2014) 79 Cal Comp Cases 1298.

IV. Has Applicant Sustained his Burden of Proving the MT is Reasonable?

Considering the range of medical evidence in the file, it is reasonable and necessary to award medical treatment in the form of the medications, Percocet and Norco and, specifically, for reimbursement of the self-procured medical treatment out-of-pocket costs of Hydrocodone/Norco in the amount of \$115. (See Exhibit "12")."

III. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the petition for reconsideration filed by

defendant herein be **DENIED** on the merits.

DATE: 6/3/15

Colleen 8. any

Colleen Casey

WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

GUTIERREZ, TOMMY – ADJ2123966

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