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Silva v. Garland
"The opinion and concurring opinion filed July 10, 2020, and appearing at 965 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2020), are withdrawn. They may not be cited by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit. A new opinion is filed simultaneously with the filing of this order, along with a concurring opinion. The petition for rehearing en banc is denied as moot. The parties may file petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc in response to the new opinion, as allowed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."
BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring: "I concur in the majority opinion in full. I write separately to reiterate yet again my view that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague. See Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Berzon, J., concurring); Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr, 946 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020) (Berzon, J., concurring). The majority opinion provides yet another example of our “failed enterprise” to consistently determine whether a crime SILVA V. GARLAND 27 involves moral turpitude when there is no “coherent criteria” as to what that phrase encompasses. Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1258–61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Fletcher, J., concurring). As “persistent efforts” have failed “to establish a standard” of what a “crime involving moral turpitude” is, it is time to revisit whether this phrase is unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, —U.S.—, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)."