Rosetta Stone's trademark/keyword lawsuit
against Google was given new life today when the Fourth Circuit vacated in part
an order granting Google summary judgment. Rosetta
Stone v. Google, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 (4th Cir. 2012) [enhanced version available to lexis.com subscribers]. Though Rosetta Stone's vicarious infringement and unjust enrichment
claims did not survive, the court vacated the Eastern District of Virginia's summary
judgment order with respect to direct infringement, contributory infringement
and trademark dilution.
In filing suit, Rosetta Stone argued that Google's
policies concerning the use of trademarks as keywords and in ad text created not
only a likelihood of confusion but also actual confusion as well, misleading
Internet users into purchasing counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. Rosetta
Stone also alleged that it had been plagued with counterfeiters since Google
changed its policy to permit the limited use of trademarks in advertising text.
In Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
Google Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78098 (E.D. Va. 2010) [enhanced version available to lexis.com subscribers], the district
court entered summary judgment against Rosetta Stone on its direct trademark
infringement claim, concluding that: (A) there was not a genuine issue of fact
as to whether Google's use of Rosetta Stone created a likelihood of confusion;
and (B) the "functionality doctrine" shielded Google from liability
in any event. The Fourth Circuit concluded that neither ground could sustain
the summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings.
As for the contributory
infringement claim, Rosetta Stone argued that the district court misapplied the
standard of review and incorrectly awarded summary judgment to Google. The
Fourth Circuit agreed, holding:
In granting summary
judgment to Google because "Rosetta Stone has not met the burden of
showing that summary judgment is proper as to its contributory trademark
infringement claim," the district court turned the summary judgment
standard on its head. While it may very well be that Rosetta Stone was not
entitled to summary judgment, that issue is not before us. The only question in
this appeal is whether, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable
inferences from that evidence in a light most favorable to Rosetta Stone, a reasonable
trier of fact could find in favor of Rosetta Stone, the nonmoving party. ... We
conclude that the evidence recited by the district court is sufficient to
establish a question of fact as to whether Google continued to supply its
services to known infringers.
Finally, Rosetta Stone successfully challenged
the summary judgment order as to the trademark dilution claim.
The district court had held that summary judgment was proper because Rosetta Stone
failed: 1) to present evidence that Google was using the Rosetta Stone marks to
identify its own goods and services; and 2) to show that Google's use of the
mark was likely to impair the distinctiveness of or harm the reputation of the
Rosetta Stone marks.
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