Immigration Law

CA9 on Pereira, Bermudez-Cota: Karingithi v. Whitaker

Karingithi v. Whitaker

"We consider whether the Immigration Court has jurisdiction over removal proceedings when the initial notice to appear does not specify the time and date of the proceedings, but later notices of hearing include that information. ... Because the charging document in this case satisfied the regulatory requirements, we conclude the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) had jurisdiction over the removal proceedings. This reading is consistent with the recent interpretation of these regulations by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or the “Board”), see Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), and the only other court of appeals to reach this issue, see Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 310–15 (6th Cir. 2018). ... The Supreme Court recently addressed the required contents of a notice to appear in the context of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a), 1229b. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pereira was not in any way concerned with the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the Court considered what information a notice to appear must contain to trigger the stop-time rule, which determines whether a noncitizen has been continuously present in the United States long enough to be eligible for cancellation of removal. Id. at 2110; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Unlike the stop-time rule, the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction does not hinge on § 1229(a), so Pereira’s narrow ruling does not control our analysis. We conclude that the IJ had jurisdiction over Karingithi’s removal proceedings and that the Board properly denied her petition."