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"In everyday English, “when” clearly “connote[s] immediacy.” . . . ’”when’ … can be read, on the one hand, to refer to ‘action or activity occurring ‘at the time that’ or ‘as soon as’ other action has ceased or begun … [But on] the other hand, ‘when’ can also be read to [mean] ‘at or during the time that,’ ‘while,’ or ‘at any or every time that. “‘ (Footnotes omitted.) This quote from an October 8, 2014 tour de force opinion of U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York in Martinez-Done v. McConnell shows the many permutations and litigation-spawning power of a four-letter word. In Martinez-Done, Judge Scheindlin canvassed the nationwide landscape of conflicting opinions interpreting the word “when” in Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c)(“Detention of Criminal Aliens”). That section requires U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers, upon the happening of a condition, to arrest and incarcerate individuals convicted of a qualifying offense without the chance for impartial review of their detention. The condition that permits mandatory detention is triggered “when,” after conviction, the individual “is released”. In this case, ICE detained Mr. Martinez-Done “nearly ten years [after] he was released from post-conviction custody.” No matter the varying meanings of “when,” the word, Judge Scheindlin ruled, could not be stretched so far into the future." - Angelo A. Paparelli, Oct. 9, 2014.