CA9 on FFOA, CIMT: Lara-Garcia v. Garland

Lara-Garcia v. Garland

"The BIA held that, in order to qualify for relief under Lujan-Armendariz, a state conviction must have resulted in a sentence of no more than one year of probation. ... In sum, the BIA legally erred by holding that, because he received a sentence of three years of probation, Petitioner’s expungement did not qualify under Lujan-Armendariz. ... The BIA’s alternative reason for denying sua sponte reopening was that Petitioner “remains removable” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because his 2006 misdemeanor convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude. ... Petitioner is correct that his convictions do not qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude. The government’s assertion to the contrary cites no legal authority, and we are aware of none. ... In short, the BIA legally erred by concluding that Petitioner “remains removable” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). We deny the petition in part and grant the petition in part. Petitioner’s motion was untimely, so we deny the petition to the extent that Petitioner challenges the BIA’s timeliness holding. But we grant the petition to the extent that Petitioner challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. We hold only that, in denying sua sponte reopening, the BIA legally erred. We remand for the BIA “to exercise its broad discretionary authority as to sua sponte reopening against the correct legal backdrop.” Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 579. PETITION DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART; REMANDED."