Use this button to switch between dark and light mode.

CA9 on VAWA, "Admission" - Enriquez v. Barr

August 13, 2020 (1 min read)

Enriquez v. Barr

"Eduardo Enriquez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Because we are bound by our decision in Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), we hold that Enriquez was not “admitted” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) when he was approved as a derivative beneficiary of his mother’s self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). We therefore deny his petition for review."

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, concurring: "I agree that, under our precedent, Enriquez cannot be deemed “admitted in any status” under the cancellation of removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), when the government approved his mother’s self-petition pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA” or the “Act”). I write separately, however, to underscore that our case law is inconsistent with the statutory context and undermines VAWA’s purpose of expanding immigration relief to undocumented immigrants who experience domestic abuse. ... In sum, the BIA’s exceedingly limited reading of “admission” is unreasonable in light of the entire statutory scheme, particularly in the context of VAWA and its remedial objective. Our acquiescence to this construction has led to an absurd and unjust result that is inconsistent with the realities of our immigration system and congressional intent. But because “[b]inding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so,” Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)), I agree that Enriquez’s petition must be denied in light of our precedent."  [Emphasis added.]

[NOTE: This petition for review was filed in 2013.]