This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 11/30/2023 "On October 30, 2023, the U.S. Department of State (Department of State) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking...
On Tuesday, Nov. 28, 2023 the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of Wilkinson v. Garland. Issue: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the...
On Nov. 17, 2023 the AAO reversed an EB-2 National Interest Waiver denial by the Texas Service Center, saying: "The Petitioner has met the requisite three prongs set forth in the Dhanasar analytical...
ICE, Aug. 15, 2023 "This Directive provides guidance to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel about Red Notices published by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL...
Georgianna Pisano Goetz, Nov. 24, 2023 "The Department of Homeland Security has been pushing inconsistent arguments about the meaning of parole under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, needlessly...
Matthew L. Hoppock writes: "This is a case where our client had an old conviction that was an Aggravated Felony and a crime involving moral turpitude, but was waivable under INA 212(c). He also a conviction that was too recent to be waived under INA 212(c). The DHS charged him with removability under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having two crimes involving moral turpitude. We argued if the IJ waived the old conviction he wouldn't have two and he wouldn't be removable. The IJ relied on an old BIA decision, Matter of Balderas, to hold that a waiver of the old conviction didn't mean it couldn't be used to charge our client with removability under 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). We appealed to the BIA and lost and then appealed to the Eighth Circuit. The DOJ agreed, once we got to the Eighth Circuit, that the agency's application of the law, specifically Matter of Balderas, seemed incorrect and joined us in a motion to remand the case to the Board. Now the Board has concluded that when an old conviction is waived under INA 212(c), that same conviction can't be used as one of the two crimes involving moral turpitude to charge someone with removability under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)."