State Department, Feb. 11, 2025 "The White House issued Executive Order "Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government" on January...
OFLC, Feb. 14, 2025 OFLC Releases Public Disclosure Data and Selected Program Statistics for Q1 of Fiscal Year 2024 The Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) has released a comprehensive set...
Lapadat v. Bondi "As appellate judges, we generally defer to the reasoned and expert judgment of our colleagues in the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), whom we trust to carefully...
Visa Bulletin for March 2025 Notes D, E and F: D. RETROGRESSION IN THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED FOURTH PREFERENCE (EB-4) CATEGORY Due to high demand and number use throughout the first half of the fiscal...
NILC, Feb. 6, 2025 "In one of his first anti-immigrant Executive Orders (EOs), President Trump threatened to make undocumented immigrants “register” with the U.S. government or face...
US v. Palomar-Santiago
"In 1998, respondent Refugio Palomar-Santiago was removed from the United States based on a conviction for felony driving under the influence (DUI). He later returned to the United States and was indicted on one count of unlawful reentry in violation of 8 U. S. C. §1326(a). Between Palomar-Santiago’s removal and indictment, this Court held that offenses like his DUI conviction do not in fact render noncitizens removable. Palomar-Santiago now seeks to defend against his unlawful-reentry charge by challenging the validity of his 1998 removal order. By statute, defendants “may not” bring such collateral attacks “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” that (1) they “exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the [removal] order,” (2) the removal proceedings “improperly deprived [them] of the opportunity for judicial review,” and (3) “entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” §1326(d). The question for the Court is whether Palomar-Santiago is excused from making the first two of these showings, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, because his prior removal order was premised on a conviction that was later found not to be a removable offense. The Court holds that the statute does not permit such an exception. ... The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."