California: W.C.A.B. Issues New, Modified Decision in Dubon

The divided W.C.A.B. has issued its long awaited en banc decision to the defendant’s appeal in Dubon v World Restoration and substantially modified its prior en banc holding to limit the ability of the W.C.A.B. to decide medical issues only in cases where UR is untimely. In doing so the W.C.A.B. completely retracted its prior holding that UR decisions which were “procedurally deficient” were subject to W.C.A.B. jurisdiction to address medical issues. In reversing itself, the W.C.A.B. effectively disagreed with its own rule ADR 10451.2 to the extent it made such procedural issues the subject of W.C.A.B. review.

The new holding of the W.C.A.B. decided on a 4-1 vote with Commissioner Lowe concurring and dissenting & Commissioner Sweeney dissenting (see Dissenting Opinions below), is set out as follows:

1. A utilization review (UR) decision is invalid and not subject to independent medical review (IMR) only if it is untimely.

2. Legal issues regarding the timeliness of a UR decision must be resolved by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), not IMR.

3. All other disputes regarding a UR decision must be resolved by IMR.

4. If a UR decision is untimely, the determination of medical necessity may be made by the WCAB based on substantial medical evidence consistent with Labor Code section 4604.5.

The W.C.A.B.’s decision provides a substantial change from its former broadly worded opinion giving wide discretion to trial judges to find UR defective based on multiple defects beyond timing issues. WCJ’s in the interim had a field day finding such perceived “procedural defects”, some of which, based on W.C.A.B. panel decisions, appeared to be very minor, a basis to assume jurisdiction over medical care. The W.C.A.B., in removing the ability to review UR based issues other than untimeliness emphasized the language in SB 863 that medical issues should be decided in UR and IMR and not by the WCJ:

“Commissioner Sweeney suggests that a UR decision that does not comply with the mandatory requirements of section 4610 is not a decision subject to IMR. (See § 4610.5(c)(3).) We disagree. The legislative intent is clear. IMR is the sole mechanism for reviewing a UR physician’s opinion regarding the medical necessity of a proposed treatment. Consistent with this, we hold that where a UR decision is timely, IMR is the sole vehicle for reviewing the UR physician’s expert opinion regarding the medical necessity of a proposed treatment, even if the UR process did not fully comply with section 4610’s requirements…

With the exception of timeliness, all other requirements go to the validity of the medical decision or decision-making process. The sufficiency of the medical records provided, expertise of the reviewing physician and compliance with the MTUS are all questions for the medical professional….”

The W.C.A.B., however, has also concluded that IMR is limited to resolving medical disputes and is not authorized to address timeliness issues. Only the W.C.A.B. can decide if UR is timely in the absence of some statutory authority for IMR to consider the issue. SB 863 did not specifically address this issue; the Board’s decision continues to rely on the decision of the California Supreme Court in Sandhagen v. W.C.A.B. which held the W.C.A.B. had authority to resolve medical disputes where UR was timely:

Sections 4610.5 and 4610.6 limit IMR to disputes over “medical necessity.” Legal disputes over UR timeliness must be resolved by the WCAB. (§ 4604 (“[c]ontroversies between employer and employee arising under this chapter shall be determined by the appeals board, … except as otherwise provided by Section 4610.5” (italics added)); § 5300 (providing that “except as otherwise provided in Division 4,” the WCAB has exclusive initial jurisdiction over claims “for the recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto”); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10451.2(c)(1)(C).)

The W.C.A.B. continued to emphasize on those occasions when the W.C.A.B. determines UR was untimely and therefore subject to decision of the W.C.A.B., the decision is not automatically to award the disputed medical treatment but to require the decision to be based upon substantial medical evidence with the applicant having the burden of proof.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:

There were 2 additional opinions in this matter. In the concurring opinion by Commissioner Lowe, she agreed with the majority’s analysis and holding in this matter but would have dismissed the entire appeal as moot since the applicant’s surgery has since been authorized based on further review. Commissioner Lowe noted that “although I unequivocally concur in the majority holdings, I maintain that it was not necessary to reach the merits here.”

Commissioner Sweeney, however, issued a strong worded dissent indicating she would uphold the initial decision in Dubon I. Making essentially the same arguments that were outlined in the original decision, she argues for W.C.A.B. jurisdiction to review medical issues on the much broader scale than the majority opinion.

COMMENTS & DISCUSSION:

This decision essentially leaves the state of the decisional law much the same as it had been before the first en banc decision in this case. While some defendants would occasionally raise the issue of W.C.A.B. jurisdiction to decide medical issues where UR was untimely, the issue did not come up nearly as often as the “procedural defects” the W.C.A.B. identified as a basis for the W.C.A.B. to decide medical treatment. Issues which had been raised to the W.C.A.B. included completeness of the medical record in UR, adequacy of the UR physician’s discussion, UR physician specialty, signature of UR by a physician (as opposed to the actual decision being made by a physician) and delay notices issued by a nurse rather an a physician. Based on the new W.C.A.B. decision, all of those issues are the kind that can be addressed in IMR when the full and more complete review of medical necessity is made.

It will be interesting to see if this case is appealed further. Certainly there is very little reason for the applicant attorney to take this case up as his client has received the requested treatment and should he do so, the argument for mootness of the decision would probably convince an appellate court that this case is no longer ripe for dispute.

For defendant, the decision must be considered a substantial win. The W.C.A.B. has significantly pulled back on the very expansive decision of Dubon I, returning the workers’ compensation community to the status quo before Dubon I. It is probably worthwhile for the employer community to attempt to obtain appellate review of the issue of W.C.A.B. jurisdiction over untimely reviews, even though the urgency of that issue is not as great as the potential chaos that Dubon I caused and was continuing to develop. Whether the Commissioners were influenced by the flood of hearings challenging UR on every conceivable issue, real or not, is something only the majority knows. Certainly the potential for reversal at the next level with the very thin justification for the original decision must, and should have, played a role in the reversal.

The new decision of the W.C.A.B. is one which is certainly much easier for the W.C.A.B. to defend in the event the case goes up. The argument the W.C.A.B. gets to decide timeliness of UR is probably supportable on the basis of the statutory scheme. The question of whether the W.C.A.B.’s remedy for such untimeliness, that a WCJ can then decide the issue, is probably still open to question at the next level but is certainly decided at this level for now.

THE TAKEAWAY FROM THIS DECISION IS CLEAR: UR NEEDS TO BE TIMELY!

© Copyright 2014 Shaw, Jacobsmeyer, Crain & Claffey PC. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.