LexisNexis has selected some recently issued noteworthy IMR decisions that illustrate the criteria that must be met to obtain authorization for a variety of different medical treatment modalities. LexisNexis...
By Hon. Susan V. Hamilton, Former Assistant Secretary and Deputy Commissioner, California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic we learned that nursing care facilities...
Home Health Assessment: When Can a Defendant Use Labor Code Section 4050 to Compel an Evaluation?
By Hon. Susan V. Hamilton, Former Assistant Secretary and Deputy Commissioner, California Workers’...
By Julius Young, Richard M. Jacobsmeyer, and Barry D. Bloom, Co-Editors-in-Chief, Herlick, California Workers’ Compensation Handbook
This 2024 edition is the 43rd edition of Herlick, California...
CALIFORNIA COMPENSATION CASES
Vol. 88, No. 10 October 2023
A Report of En Banc and Significant Panel Decisions of the WCAB and Selected Court Opinions of Related Interest, With a Digest of WCAB Decisions...
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a former employee's state court, state-law, retaliatory discharge claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA), was not a “disguised action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 185, so as to allow removal. The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court had held that § 301 of the LMRA preempts all state-law claims that require the interpretation of a CBA or any other covered labor contract. Such cases are understood to arise under federal law from their inception. On the other hand, while complete preemption sweeps away many state-law theories and re-classifies them as federal, it has its limits, said the court. The court noted that the resolution of a retaliatory discharge claim rested on a factual dispute. It required examining the employee's conduct and the employer's conduct and motivation, none of which required consulting the applicable CBA. The employer contended that a settlement agreement between the parties made it clear that the employment separation was voluntary on the plaintiff’s part. The court said things were not nearly so clear; referring to a separation as a "permanent layoff without recall rights" did not sound “voluntary” to the court. Based on the foregoing, the court held that the plaintiff’s case was not within the territory that Congress carved out to be governed exclusively by federal rules in § 301.
Reported by Thomas A. Robinson, J.D.
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See Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16372 (7th Cir., Aug. 7, 2013) [2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16372 (7th Cir., Aug. 7, 2013)]
See generally Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 104.07 [104.07]
Source: Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the nation’s leading authority on workers’ compensation law.
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