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Hats off to Steven Lyons, Martin C. Liu & Associates PLLC, New York, for this Dec. 11, 2015 unpublished BIA victory: "In the respondent's case, he did not drive under the influence with a suspended license but rather operated a motor vehicle with a license that had been suspended because of a prior DUI offense. The respondent did not commit a DUI offense knowing that he was prohibited from driving like the respondent in Matter of Lopez-Meza. The New Jersey statute is intended to deter the behavior of operating a motor vehicle during a court-imposed period of suspension for a prior DUI offense by requiring a sentence of incarceration for such an offense. New Jersey v. Perry, supra, at 531. We do not find that the respondent's offense is such a deviance from the accepted rules of contemporary morality that it amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude."