DOL, July 26, 2024 "On August 7, 2024, the Department of Labor will host a public webinar to educate stakeholders, program users, and other interested members of the public on the changes to the...
Atud v. Garland (unpub.) "Mathurin A. Atud petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on alleged ineffective...
Shen v. Garland "Peng Shen, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge ...
This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 07/25/2024 "On January 17, 2017, DHS published a final rule with new regulatory provisions guiding the use of parole on a case...
Lance Curtright reports: "After the 5th Circuit’s initial decision in Membreno, [ Membreno-Rodriguez v. Garland, 95 F.4th 219 ] my law partner Paul Hunker (a new AILA member!) reached out to...
Mena v. Lynch, Apr. 27, 2016- "Common sense suggests that knowingly receiving either stolen or embezzled property – i.e., the offense set forth in the second paragraph of § 659 - is a form of theft. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 612 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that the purpose of § 659 “is to protect goods moving in interstate commerce from theft”). However, we are not writing on a clean slate, and we may not simply rest our decision on some concept of common sense. Instead, we are obliged to apply the categorical approach, and in doing so we are guided by circuit precedent. Applying the categorical approach, we believe that Soliman, combined with a straightforward reading of §§ 659 and 1101(a)(43)(G), dictates the result in Mena’s favor. ... In short, based on our application of the categorical approach, we hold that a conviction under the second paragraph of § 659 is not a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” under § 1101(a)(43)(G). The BIA therefore erred in finding Mena to be an aggravated felon who is ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a)(3). Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
[Hats off to appointed counsel, Dave Roberts!]